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Abstract 
This papers examines the structural implications of demand shifts in free-entry oligopoly
equilibria. The model generalizes the conjectural variations framework to consider 
asymmetric ﬁrm conjectures, allows for the possibility of cost differences across ﬁrms, and
endogenizes conditions of entry and exit in the industry. In non-competitive environments,
changes in incumbent output and industry proﬁtability are inversely-related to changes in
the equilibrium price following a demand shift. In response to rotations of demand through
the equilibrium point, changes in proﬁtability are positively-related to changes in industry
concentration and, when marginal costs are non-decreasing, inversely-related to changes in
market power. 
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1. Introduction 
The effect of demand shifts on oligopoly market structure has been examined
recently by Quirmbach (1988) for the case of a ﬁxed number of homogeneous
ﬁrms. This paper extends the analysis of demand shifts to a free-entry oligopoly 
equilibrium and ﬁnds that entry considerations have a nontrivial affect on industry
outcomes. In response to a demand shift, Quirmbach ﬁnds that a decline in the
equilibrium price is a necessary condition for a decline in industry proﬁtability. We
derive the opposite implication for the free-entry case. In non-competitive
environments with free-entry, a decline in the equilibrium price following a
demand shift is both a necessary and a sufﬁcient condition for increased industry
proﬁtability.
The paper highlights an important and heretofore unrecognized connection
between the underlying motivation for de novo entry and the structural implica-
tions of a demand shift. Speciﬁcally, we identify two types of demand shifts which
induce entry in an oligopolistic equilibrium: parallel upwards shifts in demand and
clockwise rotations of demand through the equilibrium point. The effect of entry
on market performance differs markedly between these cases. For a parallel
upwards shift in demand, we ﬁnd that industry output always expands when entry
occurs, as in Seade (1980). However, in response to a clockwise rotation of
demand through the equilibrium point, industry output always contracts when
entry occurs.
Demand shifts in free-entry equilibria also have implications for changes in
industry concentration, proﬁtability and market power. In response to demand
shifts, we ﬁnd that changes in industry proﬁtability are positively-related to
changes in incumbent output, and, when marginal costs are non-decreasing,
inversely-related to changes in incumbent price-cost margins. In a wide range of
circumstances, increased proﬁtability is also associated with a decline in the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms, whence increased proﬁtability tends to occur with
heightened industry concentration, as in Clarke and Davies (1982); Dansby and
Willig (1979), and Dixit and Stern (1982).
Most theoretical analyses suggest that concentration is positively-related to
price-cost margins in an industry (e.g., Cowling and Waterson, 1976 and Harris,
1988). Somewhat paradoxically, however, intra-industry studies often ﬁnd quite
the opposite. For example, Schroeter (1988); Koontz et al. (1993); Murray (1995),
and Nebesky et al. (1995) all report decreasing market power estimates during
periods of heightened industry concentration. In a free-entry oligopoly equilibrium,
we show that industry concentration tends to vary inversely with incumbent
price-cost margins in response to a demand shift. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the very
circumstances which allow market power to be identiﬁed in intra-industry studies
always lead to antithetical changes in concentration and market power.
The paper considers a conjectural variations equilibrium which allows for cost
differences across ﬁrms. In this regard, the model is contextually similar to the
asymmetric-cost oligopoly models of Dierickx et al. (1988); Hamilton and Sandin
(1997), and Kimmel (1992) for demand shifts which arise through industry
taxation. We show that downward shifts in industry demand may increase the
proﬁts of low-cost ﬁrms, which extends the result of Dierickx et al. (1988) and
Kimmel (1992) to a free-entry oligopoly equilibrium. The demand shift approach
to taxation also allows analytically convenient analysis of comparative incidence. 
As in Dierickx et al. (1988), we ﬁnd that increases in low-cost market share are 
more likely to occur in response to downward shifts in demand which are 
combined with counterclockwise rotations (e.g., ad valorem taxation) than with
parallel downward shifts (e.g. unit taxation). Moreover, a revenue neutral tax
reform from speciﬁc to ad valorem taxation increases both industry output and 
proﬁtability, whence ad valorem taxes Pareto-dominate speciﬁc taxes in the sense 
of Skeath and Trandel (1994).
To capture a wide range of oligopoly outcomes, the conjectural variations
approach is generalized to consider cases in which conjectures differ across ﬁrms.
Thus, the framework nests all familiar forms of quantity competition, including the
case of dominant ﬁrm(s) with a competitive fringe, in a single model. The
qualitative implications of the model are robust to alternative conjectures and hold
in the Cournot-Nash case as well as for less theoretically-supported conjectures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, a model of
free-entry oligopoly is developed which considers asymmetric ﬁrm conjectures,
allows for differences in the productive efﬁciency of ﬁrms, and endogenizes
conditions of entry and exit. Section 3 presents comparative statics effects of a
demand shift on the output of incumbent ﬁrms and on the equilibrium number of
ﬁrms. Several propositions are derived regarding the effect of a demand shift on
industry output, the equilibrium price, incumbent market shares, market power,
industry concentration and proﬁtability. Concluding comments are provided in
section 4. 
2. A generalized model of free-entry oligopoly 
The foundation for the following analysis is a conjectural variations oligopoly
model with endogenous entry as conceived by Seade (1980) and employed by
Besley (1989), Delipalla and Keen (1992), and Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
The model distinguishes between small, high-cost ﬁrms and large, relatively
cost-efﬁcient ﬁrms as in Dierickx et al. (1988); Hamilton and Sandin (1997), and
1Kimmel (1992). Conjectures are allowed to differ in the model between low- and
high-cost ﬁrms, which extends the conjectural variations approach to encompass
other familiar forms of quantity competition such as the case of dominant ﬁrm(s)
with a competitive fringe.2 
Consider an equilibrium comprised of N 5 n 1 n ﬁrms which produce al h 
1 One might expect the cost structure of ﬁrms in an industry to differ due to varying rates of success
in the innovation game. Cost differences may persist in equilibrium when patents and rival price-
response behavior preempt imitation by high-cost ﬁrms (see Harris, 1988; Reinganum, 1985 and
Vickers, 1986).
2 Equilibrium behavior is modeled here in the context of a simultaneous move game. Extension of the
model to a sequential move game would be relatively straightforward. 
homogeneous good, where nl is the number of low-cost ﬁrms, each with the cost 
function c ( y ), and n is the number of high-cost ﬁrms, each with the cost l l h
function c ( y ). The output of a low- and high-cost representative ﬁrm is denoted h h 
y l and yh, respectively. The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is 
p i5 P(Y)y 2 c ( y ), (1) i i i 
where Y5o y is total industry output and P(Y) is the inverse demand function. i i
The relative efﬁciency of a representative ﬁrm in each sub-group is described as
follows: Firm l is (weakly) more efﬁcient than ﬁrm h whenever 
dc ( y l ) dc ( yh)l h]]u y <]]]u y . (2) * *i hdy l dyh 
Condition (2) states that the marginal cost of a low-cost producer is no greater
than that of a high-cost producer at the respective equilibrium output levels. To
achieve greater clarity in the comparative statics results, we further deﬁne the
relative efﬁciency of low- and high-cost ﬁrms with respect to marginal perturba-
tions in output. Speciﬁcally, we wish to eliminate the somewhat unusual case in
which a small, high-cost ﬁrm has higher marginal cost than a large, low-cost ﬁrm,
but has greater capacity to expand production in response to a demand shift. To
maintain the identity of high- and low-cost ﬁrms for a marginal expansion in
output, we impose 
d2c ( y ) d2c ( y )l l h h]]2]u y * <]]2]u y *. (3) l hd( y ) d( y )l h 
Condition (3) states that a marginal expansion of output does not raise the
marginal cost function of a low-cost ﬁrm by more than that of a high-cost ﬁrm.
This condition eliminates ambiguity in the deﬁnition of low-cost ﬁrms by ruling
out situations in which high- and low-cost ﬁrms switch identity in response to
small perturbations of output.3 
Differentiating proﬁt expression (1), the ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm i is 
p iy 5 P1diP9y 2 ciy 5 0, (4) ii i 
where P9,0 denotes the derivative of inverse demand with respect to industry 
4output. The second-order condition of ﬁrm i is 
3 Condition (3) is sufﬁcient, though not necessary, for the results that follow. Such a condition is
likely to be met in practical applications, as low-cost ﬁrms may have higher marginal costs at low
levels of output, yet be operating at a scale which is well beyond any crossing of marginal cost with
high-cost ﬁrms.
4 For notational convenience, the arguments of the demand function are hereafter suppressed. 
i 2 i p y y 5 2diP91d i P0yi 2 cy y , 0, (5) i i i i 
where d 5≠Y /≠y is the conjectural variations parameter. Throughout, we consider i i
symmetric conjectures within each subgroup, though the conjecture of a low-cost
ﬁrm may differ from that of a high-cost ﬁrm. When conjectures are symmetric
across all ﬁrms in an industry, the model reduces to familiar cases of perfectly
competitive behavior (d 50, ; ), Cournot-Nash behavior (d 51, ; ), and tacit i i i i
collusion (d 5n , ; ). When conjectures differ across ﬁrms, the model reduces to i i i
the special case of low-cost dominant ﬁrm(s) with a high-cost competitive fringe
with restrictions d 50 and d 5n . The model generalizes other potential market h l l
structures as well, such as the case of Cournot-Nash behavior by low-cost ﬁrms
with a competitive fringe or Cournot-Nash behavior by high-cost ﬁrms with a
low-cost producer cartel.
Conﬁning attention to symmetric subgroup equilibria, the ﬁrst-order condition
(4) is expressed in terms of an average ﬁrm within each subgroup as 
p i 5P 1gY P92 ci 5 0, (6) y i i yi i 
where g 5d /n [[0,1] and Y 5n y  represents the total output of ﬁrms in subgroup i i i i i i 
i. 
To address entry in the model, the number of high-cost ﬁrms is treated as a
continuous variable following Besley (1989), Mankiw and Whinston (1986), and
Seade (1980). Demand shifts are assumed to be modest enough to not affect the
number of low-cost ﬁrms, whence attention is conﬁned to small ﬁrm entry and
5exit. Low-cost ﬁrms receive positive proﬁts in equilibrium, while the entry of
small, relatively-inefﬁcient ﬁrms occurs until proﬁt is driven to zero in the 
high-cost industry subgroup. In equilibrium, the number of high-cost ﬁrms in the
industry, n* h , solves 
p h* 5P(Y*)y* 2 c ( y*) 5 0, (7) h h h 
where Y*5n y* *1n y*. The equilibrium number of high-cost ﬁrms is determined l l h h
simultaneously with y* and y* from the ﬁrst-order conditions (6) and the entry l h
condition (7).6 
The conditions for existence and stability are analogous to those of Dixit (1986)
and Seade (1987): 
k . 0, (8) i 
5 That small scale, de novo entry appears to be more common than the entry of large ﬁrms in most
industries is supported by Geroski (1995).
6 It is assumed throughout that the equilibrium number of high-cost ﬁrms is unique, as is the case
when at least a portion of ﬁxed costs are sunk (Vickers, 1989). 
where ki 5 ciy y 2diP9, and i i  
P91P0Y < 0. (9) 
In addition, we conﬁne attention to cases in which the conjecture of a representa-
tive low-cost ﬁrm is no less than that of a high-cost ﬁrm, 
d >d (10) l h 
Expression (10) allows for the possibility that small, high-cost ﬁrms may feel
more able to get away with output changes undetected than larger ﬁrms. 
Lemma 1. The asymmetric-cost equilibrium satisﬁes dl y l >dh yh. 
Proof. Equating ﬁrst-order condition (4) for a representative low- and high-cost 
ﬁrm, P9(d y 2d y )5c92c9. The proof follows directly from marginal cost 1 1  h h  1 h
condition (2). 
Lemma 2. Y2d y .0.h h  
Proof. Industry output may be decomposed into subgroup output as Y5Y 1Y ,h l
whence Y2d y 5Y 1(12g )Y , which is positive by g <1.h h l h h h 
3. Demand shifts and industry equilibrium 
Following Dixit (1986) and Quirmbach (1988), let u represent a demand-side 
interaction variable; that is, P5P(Y; u ). A movement in the interaction variable
may induce a vertical shift in demand, a rotation of demand through the initial
equilibrium point, or some combination of the two effects.
The comparative statics effects of a demand shift are calculated by totally
differentiating the ﬁrst-order condition (6) for a representative ﬁrm in each
sub-group and entry condition (7), making use the envelope theorem. Combining
equations, we have 
l n v y v dy P 1g Y P9l h l h l l u l l  u 
n lvh lh yhvh dyh 5 2  Pu 1gh hY Pu9 du, (11) 3 43 4 3 4n Pl 9yh (1 2g )P9Yh P9( yh)2 dnh P y uh h 
where vi 5(P91gY Pi 0) and li 5p iy y 1n (12gi )vi. Denoting the coefﬁcient i ii imatrix in (11) by V, its determinant is 
2 hDet(V) 5 2 y P9k p ,h l y yh h  
which is negative by the second-order condition (5) with the stability condition
(8). 
The effects of a demand shift on the output of a high- and low-cost ﬁrm are 
dy d y Fh h h]5]]], (12) du P h9p y yh h  
and 
dy l fdl y kl h 2dhP9(dl y l 2dh yh)gF ]5]]]]]]]]], (13) du P9k lp h y yh h  
respectively, where F5(P P02P P9 9). For demand shifts which satisfy Pu50, Fu u
may be written in elasticity form as, F 5 (´ 2´ P ,Y u 9 /Y, where eP9,Y5 P0Y /P9,Y )P Pu 
9 is the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand and e 5 P Y /P is the price P P ,Y 9u uuelasticity of the shift in demand. If one thinks of demand as a surface in (P,Y,u ),
then the term in the parentheses is positive if the slope of the demand surface in
the direction of the output axis is more sensitive to changes in output than is the
slope of the demand surface in the direction of the shift parameter.
A change in the interaction variable affects the number of high-cost ﬁrms as 
dn 2 P ku p h y y  1F df Y kl 1dhY k l(1 2g ) 2 n ld P9(dl y 2dh y ) jh l l h h h h l h gh h h]5]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]].du P9y kh lp h y yh h  
(14) 
The signs of expressions (12), (13), and (14) depend on industry conjectures, 
9the level effect (P ) and rotation effect (P ) of the shift. When a demand shift u u
involves an upwards level effect (P .0), the ﬁrst term in the numerator of (14) u
reﬂects the entry incentive created by an increase in the marginal proﬁtability of
high-cost ﬁrms. In noncompetitive environments, a shift in demand also creates a
strategic entry effect through F. The strategic effect depends on both the rotation
effect and the concavity of demand. If demand is concave, incumbent ﬁrms
operate in a region where marginal revenue is fairly steep and thus make smaller
output adjustments to restore their ﬁrst-order conditions relative to the case of
linear demand. In response to a demand shift, the greater the concavity of demand,
the smaller the output response of incumbent ﬁrms and the larger the latitude for
high-cost ﬁrm entry.
The ultimate effect of a demand shift depends on the speciﬁc combination of
level and rotation effects which occur in the industry equilibrium. Throughout, we 
refer to the rotation effect as one of clockwise rotation (P9 ,0) or counter-u
clockwise rotation (P9 .0) and center attention on the separate effects of parallel u
shifts and demand rotations. Demand shifts, in general, affect industry structure
through different aggregations of these outcomes. 
Proposition 1. The following effects occur in response to a counterclockwise (resp. 
clockwise) rotation of demand through the equilibrium point: 
1.	 the number of high-cost ﬁrms does not change when di 50, ;i; when dl .0,
high-cost exit (resp. entry) occurs;
2.	 industry output does not change when dh 50; when dh .0, industry output 
increases (resp. decreases); 
3.	 the market share of ﬁrm i does not change when di 50; when di .0 the 
market share of ﬁrm i increases (resp. decreases); 
4.	 the CR(k) index of industry concentration does not change when d 50, ;i;i 
when d .0, the CR(k) increases (resp. decreases); l
5.	 If the marginal cost of a representative high-cost ﬁrm in non-decreasing in 
output, the elasticity of demand increases (resp. decreases). 
Proof. We ﬁrst consider the case of counterclockwise rotation (P 50 and P9 .0). u u
When d 50, ;i, the number of ﬁrms remains constant in (14). When d .0, the i	 i
numerator of (14) is negative by (8) and lemma 1. The denominator of (14) is
positive by (5) and (8). It follows that exit of high-cost ﬁrms occurs in response to 
counterclockwise rotations of demand. The opposite is true for P 50 and P9 ,0.u u
The change in industry quantity is calculated from (12), (13), and (14) as 
dY /du 5 n (dy /du ) 1 n (dy /du ) 1 y (dn /du ), which yields 1 l h h h h 
2 P p h 1 Fd 2 ydY u y y  h hh h]5]]]]]].	 (15) du hP9p y yh h  
The denominator of (15) is positive by (5). For P 50 and P9 .0, a demand shift u u
has no effect on industry output when d .0. When d .0, the numerator of (15) is h h
positive, whence industry output increases. The opposite is true for P 50 and 
P9 ,0, which completes part (ii). 
u 
u
The market share of ﬁrm i is given by s 5y /Y, whence the effect on market i i
share is ds /du 5 Y 22[Y(dy /du ) 2 y (dY /du )]. Using (12), (13), and (15), ai i i
demand shift affects the market share of a representative high- and low-cost ﬁrm 
as 
ds yh[Pup h y y  1 Fdh(Y 2dh yh)]h h h]5]]]]]]]]	 (16) du 2 h
P9Y p y y 
h h  
and 
P y k p h 1F [y (d Yk 2d 2 y k  ) 2d P9Y(d y 2d y )]ds u l l  y y  l l h h h l h l l h hl h h]5]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]], (17) 2 hdu	 P9Y k lp y yh h  
respectively. The denominator of (16) is positive by (5), while the denominator of 
(17) is positive by (5) and (8). For the case of counterclockwise rotation, high-cost
market share does not change in (16) when d 50. When d 50, d 50 by condition h l h
(10), which implies low-cost market share does not change in (17). When d .0,h
the numerator of (16) is positive by lemma 2, whence high-cost market share
increases. When dl .0, a sufﬁcient condition for low-cost market share to increase 
in (17) is (d Yk 2d 2 y k  ) . 0 by lemma 1. Adding and subtracting d k Y  to this 1	 h h h l h l2 h lterm gives, (dlYk 2d h y k l )5Y(d cy y  2dhc ) 1d k l(Y 2d yh), where the ﬁrst h h l y y  h hh h l lterm is positive by (3) and (10) and the second term is positive by lemma 2. The 
opposite is true for Pu50 and P9 ,0. 
The change in the CR(k) is, k
u
(ds /du ),;k < n , whence the CR(k) index does l l
not change when dl 50, but increases for P 50 and Pu9 .0 when d .0 as a u	 l
corollary to part (iii). If k.n , the CR(k) index sums the market share of ﬁrms in l
the low-cost subgroup plus a fraction of ﬁrms in the high-cost subgroup, which
implies d[CR(k)] /du 5 n (ds /du ) 1 (k 2 n )(ds /du ). This expression reduces to l	 l l h 
n (ds /du ) when d 50 in (16). When d .0, the change in the CR(k) index is l	 l h h
positive as market share increases for a ﬁrm in either subgroup. The opposite is 
true for Pu50 and P9u ,0. 
Denoting the absolute value of the demand elasticity as h52P/P9Y, the effect 
of a demand shift on the demand elasticity is calculated from (15) as 
dh 22 dY dY	 dYH S D 1 PY P S DD	 ,]5 (P9Y) PP9 ] S 9 1 P0 ] S ]2 P9Y P  1 P9S DDJ u	 udu du du du 
which yields, 
2 PP9P p h 1F [PYk 2d P9Y(P 1d y P9) 1d 2 y PP9]≠h u h h  h h h h hy y 	  h ]5]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]. (18) (P9Y)2P9p h y y≠u h h  
The denominator of (18) is positive, while the numerator is of ambiguous sign. For
Pu50 and P9u .0, the numerator is positive when PYkh 1d 2h hy PP9.  0 by ﬁrst-
order condition (4). Factoring this expression,PYk 1d 2h y PP95  P[Ych y y 2h h h h  
d P9(Y 2dh y )], whence chy y > 0 is a sufﬁcient condition for ≠h / ≠u . 0 by h h h hlemma 2. The opposite result obtains for Pu50 and P9 ,0. Q.E.D. u 
Proposition 2. The following effects occur in response to a parallel upwards (resp. 
downwards) shift in demand: 
1.	 industry output increases (resp decreases); 
2.	 entry (resp. exit) occurs if the marginal cost function of a representative 
low-cost ﬁrm is non-decreasing in output;
3.	 high-cost market share decreases (resp. increases); low-cost market share 
decreases (resp. increases) if the marginal cost function of a representative 
low-cost ﬁrm is non-decreasing in output;
4.	 the CR(k) index of industry concentration decreases (resp. increases) if the 
marginal cost function of a representative low-cost ﬁrm is non-decreasing in 
output;
5.	 the elasticity of demand decreases (resp. increases) if the marginal cost 
function of a representative high-cost ﬁrm is non-decreasing in output. 
Proof. A parallel shift in demand affects industry output in expression (15) as 
dY P [k 2d P9]u	 h h]5]]]],	 (19) du hP9p y yh h  
which is positive for P .0 by (5) and (8). The opposite is true for P ,0.u	 u
For a parallel outward shift in demand, entry of high-cost ﬁrms occurs in
expression (14) whenever P0<0 by (8) and lemma 1, as F.0. The remaining 
case is that of convex demand. If P950, the number of high-cost ﬁrms changes as u 
dn P [c l k 2d k (P91  P0Y ) 2d k (P91  P0Y ) 2d P9(d y n P02d (P91  P0Y))] u	 y y  h l h l h l h h h h l lh l l
]5]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]. (20) du	 P9y kh lp h y yh h  
The denominator of (20) is positive by (5) and (8). For P .0, the numerator is u
positive when P0.0 if the marginal cost function of a representative low-cost ﬁrm
is non-decreasing by conditions (8) and (9), whence entry occurs following a
parallel outward shift in demand. The opposite is true for P ,0.u
A parallel outward shift in demand decreases the market share of each
incumbent ﬁrm when P0<0, as the numerator of (16) is negative by lemma 2 and
the numerator of (17) is negative by (3), (10), and the lemmas. A parallel shift
affects market shares as 
ds 2 P [k 2d (P91  P0Y)]h u h h]5]]]]]]]	 (21) du 2 h
P9Y p y y 
h h  
and 
2 P [y (k 2d P9)(c l 2d (P91  P0Y)) 2d 2 y P9P0Y]ds u l h h y y  l h hl	 l l]5]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]], (22) 2 hdu	 P9Y k lp y yh h  
for high- and low-cost ﬁrms, respectively. Both denominators are positive, as
before. The numerator of (21) is negative for P .0 by (8) and (9), while the u
numerator of (22) is negative if the marginal cost function of a representative
low-cost ﬁrm is non-decreasing by (8) and (9). It follows that incumbent market
shares decrease. The opposite is true for P ,0, which completes part (iii). Noting u
the argument in part (iv) of proposition 1, the effect of a parallel shift on the CR(k)
index of industry concentration follows directly.
If the marginal cost function of a representative ﬁrm is non-decreasing in output,
the elasticity of demand decreases for P .0 when P0<0 when by (4) and lemma u
2. A parallel shift changes the elasticity of demand as 
≠h 2 P [d 2 y (P9)2P0Y 2 P(k 2d P9)(P91  P0Y)]u	 h h h h]5]]]]]]]]]]]]],	 (23) (P9Y)2P9p h y y≠u h h  
where the denominator of (23) is positive by (5). If P0.0 the numerator is 
negative when P .0 by (8) and (9). The opposite is true when P ,0. Q.E.D. u	 u
Propositions 1 and 2 illuminate several interesting observations regarding
market structure in free-entry equilibria. For example, our results modify the
ﬁnding of Seade (1980) that industry output always expands as entry occurs in a
free-entry oligopoly equilibrium. If entry is motivated by a parallel upwards shift
in demand, proposition 2 reﬂects the fact that industry output indeed expands as
entry occurs when the marginal cost functions of low-cost ﬁrms are non-decreas-
ing. However, exactly the opposite result obtains when the stimulus for entry is a
clockwise rotation of demand, as industry output always contracts with entry under
these circumstances by proposition 1.
In noncompetitive environments, changes in the equilibrium number of high-
cost ﬁrms are inversely-related to changes in the demand elasticity in propositions
71 and 2. When a demand shift increases the demand elasticity, concentration also
tends to increase. A positive relationship between industry concentration and the
elasticity of demand has been reported elsewhere in the literature on oligopoly,
both theoretically (e.g., Cowling and Waterson, 1976; Clarke and Davies, 1982)
and empirically (Pagoulatos and Sorenson, 1986; Joesch and Zick, 1994). 
Proposition 3. If F.0 (resp. ,0); 
1.	 the equilibrium price does not change when dh 50; when dh .0, the 
equilibrium price decreases (resp. increases); 
2.	 the output of ﬁrm i does not change when di .0, ;i, when di .0, the output 
of ﬁrm i increases (resp. decreases); 
3.	 industry proﬁtability does not change when dl 50; when dl .0, industry
proﬁtability increases (resp. decreases); 
4.	 the price-cost margin of ﬁrm i does not change when di 50; when di .0, the 
price-cost margin of ﬁrm i decreases (resp. increases) if the marginal cost 
function of ﬁrm i is non-decreasing in output; 
Proof. The change in the equilibrium price, dP/du 5 P 1 P9(dY /du ), reduces to u 
dP d 2 y F 
]5]
h h],	 (24) du h p y yh h  
7 Entry may occur when the elasticity of demand increases, however, for demand shifts which 
involve both P u .0 and P9u .0 or both P u ,0 and P9u ,0. 
where the denominator of (24) is negative by (5). When d 50, a demand shift has h
no effect on the equilibrium price. When d .0, the numerator of (24) is positive h
iff F.0. 
When d 50, the output of a representative high-cost ﬁrm does not change in h
(12). When d .0, the output of a high-cost ﬁrm increases iff F.0, as the h
denominator of (12) is positive by second-order condition (5). When d 50, d 50,l h
by condition (10) and the output of a representative low-cost ﬁrm does not change.
When d .0, the output of a low-cost ﬁrm increases in (13) iff F.0 by (5), (8) l
and lemma 1. 
Industry proﬁtability, P, sums low-cost ﬁrm proﬁts in the free-entry oligopoly
equilibrium. The change in industry proﬁtability in response to a demand shift is
thus dP /du 5 n l[y l(dP/du ) 1 (P2 c l y l )(dy l / du )]. Recognizing that P92c
l 
y l 52  P9dl ly by ﬁrst-order condition (4), a demand shift affects industry proﬁtability as 
≠P 2 n y F [d 2 y k  2d 2 y k 2d d  P9(d y 2d y )]l l l l h h h l l h l l h h] ]]]]]]]]]]]]]5 ]. (25) h≠u k lp y yh h  
The denominator of (25) is negative by (5) and (8). When d 50, d 50 by l h
condition (10) and industry proﬁtability does not change. When d .0, a sufﬁcient l
condition for the expression in square brackets to be positive is (d 2 y k  2l l h2 2 2d y k ) . 0 by lemma 1. Factoring this term yields (d y k  2d y k ) 5h h l l l h h h l
2 h 2 l
(d y c  2d y c  ) 2d d  P9(d y 2d y ), which is positive by (3), (10) and l l y y  h h  y y  h l l l h hh h l llemma 1. Therefore, the term in square brackets is positive and industry 
proﬁtability increases iff F.0. 
The price-cost margin of ﬁrm i is represented by the Lerner index, which,
making use of ﬁrst-order condition (4), is L 5 2d y P9 /P. The change in the i i i 
Lerner index is dL /du 5d P22[P9y (dP/du ) 2 Py (P9 1 P0(dY /du )) 2 PP9(dy /i i i i u i
du )], which yields 
2d y F [Pch 2d P9(P1d y P9)]dL h h  y y  h h hh h h]5]]]]]]]]]]] (26) 2 hdu P P9p y yh h  
and 
2d F  Py c l k 2d P9[y c l (P1d y P9) 2 P9d y (P1d y P9)]dL l h l y y  h h l y y  h h h h l l jl l l l l]5]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]].du 2 hP P9k lp y yh h  
(27) 
The denominator of (26) is positive by (5), while the denominator of (27) is
positive by (5) and (8). When d 50, the market power of ﬁrm i does not change. i 
When di .0 and ciy y > 0, market power increases in (26) and (27) iff F,0 by (4) 
and (8). Q.E.D. i i  
A demand shift has no effect on price in a free-entry competitive equilibrium.
Low- and high-cost competitive ﬁrms do not adjust output in response to changes
in demand conditions, while high-cost entry (resp. exit) occurs in response to 
upwards (resp. downwards) shifts in demand. Industry output increases by yh in 
expression (15) for every high-cost ﬁrm which enters the industry through (14) in
the competitive case.
In noncompetitive environments, the effect of a demand shift in a free-entry
equilibrium modiﬁes several implications which arise with a ﬁxed number of
ﬁrms. Quirmbach (1988) ﬁnds that an increase in industry output is a necessary
condition for a decrease in the equilibrium price. This need not be the case in
free-entry equilibria. In response to a downward parallel shift in demand, for
example, the equilibrium price declines when demand is convex by proposition 3,
while high-cost ﬁrms exit the industry and aggregate output decreases by
proposition 2. Quirmbach also derives the intuitive result that a decline in the
equilibrium price is a necessary condition for a decrease in industry proﬁtability.
We ﬁnd just the opposite in a free-entry oligopoly equilibrium. In an oligopolistic
industry with free entry, a decline in the equilibrium price is both a necessary and
a sufﬁcient condition for industry proﬁtability to increase by proposition 3.
The change in industry concentration is positively-related to the change in
proﬁtability for an exogenous shock that rotates demand through the equilibrium
point or involves a parallel shift of a non-convex demand function. This result is
consistent with the positive relationship between industry concentration and
proﬁtability found by Dixit and Stern (1982) and Clarke and Davies (1982) for
asymmetric-cost oligopoly equilibria with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms.
A rotation of demand through the equilibrium point always leads to antithetical
changes in industry concentration and incumbent price-cost margins in a free-entry
oligopoly equilibrium. This result is consistent with the empirical regularity of
decreased market power estimates during periods of heightened industry con-
centration, as demand rotations correspond with the precise situation in which
market power is identiﬁed in intra-industry studies [see Bresnahan (1982); Just and
Chern (1980), and Lau (1982)]. The intuition for an inverse relationship between
industry concentration and market power under these circumstances is as follows.
Consider a market demand curve that is of less than unit elasticity. Such a market
is characterized by relatively ‘‘soft’’ rival price-response behavior compared to the
unit-elastic case, as a marginal expansion of output by an incumbent ﬁrm is
associated with a larger decrease in the equilibrium price. Thus, higher price-cost
margins are maintained, ceteris paribus, and a greater number of inefﬁcient,
high-cost ﬁrms produce in the equilibrium of the relatively inelastic demand
market. If an exogenous shock then rotates demand counterclockwise through the
equilibrium point, the demand function becomes more readily able to absorb 
increases in production without creating large, commensurate decreases in the
equilibrium price. Consequently, incumbent ﬁrms expand output, industry price-
cost margins decrease, and high-cost ﬁrms exit the industry, thereby increasing
industry concentration. To the extent that structural differences between free-entry
oligopoly equilibria result from variation in the slope of demand, one might expect
market power to be lower in highly concentrated industries.
In a wide range of circumstances, changes in industry proﬁtability are inversely-
related to changes in market power following a demand shift. This result 
underscores an important issue in market regulation. If market power is an 
effective proxy for efﬁciency loss in an industry, as in Dansby and Willig (1979),
incumbent ﬁrms in a free-entry oligopoly are likely to have private objectives that
are well-aligned with social objectives in response to perturbations of demand.
Increased market power in a free-entry equilibrium is both socially undesirable and
privately disadvantageous, as large price-cost margins stimulate entry and reduce
the proﬁts of incumbent ﬁrms. It follows that changes in industry structure, per se,
do not warrant market intervention, whence our analysis arrives at a familiar
location in the policy debate by means of a quite different vehicle.
The present model has a variety of applications. For example, the demand-side
interaction variable encompasses effects which occur through trade liberalization,
environmental regulation, producer liability, and advertising. In advertising
contexts, the implication of the model is that increased advertising intensity is
most proﬁtable when new customer demand is more elastic than that of existing
customers. In the context of international trade, domestic proﬁtability may increase
with trade liberalization if demand shifts downward but becomes more elastic with 
the availability of foreign products.
The demand-side interaction variable is also useful for the analysis of tax
incidence. For example, a speciﬁc tax affects the price received by ﬁrms as P ,0u
and P9u 50, while an ad valorem tax, which rotates the demand curve downward 
about its horizontal intercept, involves P ,0 and P9 .0 in equilibrium. For the u u
examination of comparative incidence, tax reforms which hold the value of P
8constant are ﬁrst-order revenue neutral. Thus, the model extends the result of
u 
Dierickx et al. (1988) that increases in low-cost market share are more likely with
ad valorem taxes than with equal-yield unit taxes to free-entry oligopoly
equilibria. While a tax of either form increases the proﬁts of low-cost ﬁrms when
demand is concave, as in Dierickx et al. (1988) and Kimmel (1992), a ﬁrst-order 
8 The use of revenue neutral tax reforms for the analysis of comparative incidence follows Suits and
Musgrave (1955). A ﬁrst-order revenue neutral tax reform corresponds with the ‘‘P-shift’’ from speciﬁc 
to ad valorem taxation considered by Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
revenue neutral reform from speciﬁc to ad valorem taxation always increases
industry proﬁtability in (25). Moreover, such a tax reform increases industry
output in (15) and lowers the equilibrium price in (24), as found by Delipalla and
Keen (1992). In free-entry oligopoly equilibria, it follows that ad valorem taxes 
Pareto-dominate speciﬁc taxes in the sense of Skeath and Trandel (1994). 
4. Concluding comments 
The central purpose of this paper was to examine the structural implications of
demand shifts in free-entry oligopoly equilibria. In response to demand shifts, a
decline in the equilibrium price was shown to be a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for incumbent output and industry proﬁtability to increase under 
oligopolistic market structures. A wide range of outcomes are possible regarding
changes in market share, concentration, and the equilibrium number of ﬁrms.
However, when attention was focused on conditions which allow market power to
be identiﬁed in intra-industry studies, changes in market power were shown to be
inversely-related to both changes in concentration and in incumbent market share.
The paper made an important distinction between the motivation for de novo 
entry in an industry and implications of entry on market performance. If the
impetus for entry is a parallel upwards shift in demand, industry output always
expands as entry occurs, as in Seade (1980). Conversely, if the motivation for
entry is a clockwise rotation of demand, the paper demonstrated that industry
output always contracts as entry occurs.
In a wide range of circumstances, an inverse-relationship was found between
changes in industry proﬁtability and changes in the price-cost margins of
incumbent ﬁrms. This result highlights an important issue in market regulation. To
the extent that industry price-cost margins proxy efﬁciency loss in free-entry
oligopoly equilibria, private and social incentives may be well-aligned in response
to perturbations of demand.
An interesting area for future research is to consider collusion incentives in a
somewhat richer context which includes both intra-industry and inter-industry
conditions. A modiﬁcation of the present model along dynamic lines may allow
parameterization of collusive relationships which depend on a continuum of entry
conditions. While theory might suggest the familiar collusion incentive to increase
price-cost margins under conditions of perfect entry deterrence, perfect market
contestability may create a quasi-competitive climate in which ﬁrms collude to
reduce price–cost margins due to entry considerations. As the entry of small,
inefﬁcient ﬁrms is likely to be socially undesirable in oligopolistic industries [see
Dierickx et al. (1988)], such forms of collusion may be welfare-improving in
broad classes of market equilibria. 
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